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STATE TAXATION OF UNITARY
BUSINESSES
I. Introduction
Modern business arrangements are often dictated by geographi-
cal considerations. In the textiles industry, for example, the
warmth and moisture of the southeast create an optimum environ-
ment for the processing of cotton. The manufacturing phase of
spinning and weaving is customarily located in a state such as
South Carolina. Once the dyed and finished cloth is ready for man-
ufacture into garments, it is transported to a heavily populated
state such as New York, where the supply of a skilled work force
makes garment manufacture feasible. In addition, because the tex-
tiles marketplace is historically centered in places like New York
and Chicago, executive and sales offices of the textile company are
located in those cities. Thus, the transformation of raw material
into a marketable product stretches across South Carolina, New
York and Illinois. This textiles business is an example of what is
known as a multistate' business. Assuming a jurisdictional nexus is
present, all three states may tax the income derived from sources
within each state.'
The income taxation of multistate businesses has created vexing
problems for tax administrators and businesses. A problem most
resilient to solution is how to divide the income of a multistate bus-
iness among the states which claim tax jurisdiction. The concepts
of unitary business and formula apportionment were developed by
the states to serve as an expedient and rational means by which to
divide the income of a multistate business for tax purposes.' A uni-
1. A multistate business is one which engages in operations in more than one state, and,
as a result of these operations, may conceivably be subject to taxation in each state. For a
description and survey of multistate businesses, see HousE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, STATE
TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE, H.R. REP. No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 69-90 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as 1964 HOUSE REPORT].
2. The chief limitations on a state's taxing power are imposed by the due process clause
and the commerce clause. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; id. art. 1, § 8. See pt. 11 infra.
3. The best analyses of these concepts include G. ALTMAN & F. KEESLING, ALLOCATION OF
INCOME IN STATE TAXATION (1950) [hereinafter cited as ALTMAN & KEESLING]; HOUSE COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE, H.R. REP. No. 1480, 88th
Cong., 2d. Sess. (1964). Other helpful discussions include: W. BEAMAN, PAYING TAXES To
OTHER STATES (1963) [hereinafter cited as BEAMAN]; Dane, A Solution to the Problems of
State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 12 VILL. L. REv. 507 (1967); Hartman, State Taxa-
tion of Corporate Income From a Multistate Business, 13 VAND. L. REv. 21 (1959); Heller-
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tary business is one in which the operations conducted both within
and without the taxing state cannot be separated for the purpose of
measuring the income earned in each state. Formula apportion-
ment will allocate the income of the unitary multistate business
between the taxing jurisdiction and other states by means of a
mathematical ratio.' Thus, the unitary business concept is the first
step in identifying the tax base; the second step is to apply a math-
ematical ratio to calculate how much of the income of the busi-
ness entity is to be allocated to the taxing state. The income so
allocated by the formula apportionment procedure forms the basis
upon which a net income or franchise tax can be imposed.5
In dividing the income of a multistate business for tax purposes,
little difficulty is presented if the laws of the states are uniform.
However, if any pattern exists in state taxation practices, it is that
of diversity.' Differences exist in the definition of a "unitary" busi-
ness, which part of the income of such a business should be appor-
tioned, the tax situs of income, and the proper application of the
apportionment formula. The list of problems above is far from ex-
haustive.7 Because of this wide diversity in state practices, there
are dangers of under or over taxation.
Congress has recognized that the area of division of income for
state taxation of multistate business is in critical need of uniform-
ity. However, the numerous attempts made to standardize the
stein, Recent Developments in State Tax Apportionment and the Circumscription of a Uni-
tary Business, 21 NAT'L TAX J. 487 (1968); Lynn, Formula Apportionment of Corporate
Income for State Tax Purposes: Natura Non Facit Saltum, 18 OHIo ST. L.J. 84 (1957);
Rudolph, State Taxation of Interstate Business, The Unitary Business Concept and Affili-
ated Corporate Groups, 25 TAX L. Rav. 171 (1970).
4. See pt. IV infra.
5. A net income tax is a direct levy on income earned within the tax jurisdiction. A
franchise tax is an imposition for the privilege of engaging in business in the tax jurisdiction;
the net income earned in the jurisdiction serves as a measure of the tax. See 1964 HOUSE
REPOr, supra note 1, at 99-129. The primary purpose of state income and franchise taxes is
to raise revenue to meet the costs of government. Because multistate businesses obtain pro-
tection and benefits from the taxing jurisdictions, it is only fair that they share in the costs
of such services. See Hartman, State Taxation of Corporate Income From a Multistate Busi-
ness, 13 VAND. L. REV. 21, 21-23 (1959). See also. note 166 infra.
6. See generally [1967] STATE & Loc. TAXES, ALL STATES UNIT (P-H) 101-1051.
7. See, e.g., Braden, Cutting the Gordian Knot of Interstate Taxation, 18 OHio ST. L.J.
57 (1957); P. HARTMAN, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE (1953); Drazen, Recent
Trends in State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 34 TAXES 286 (1956); Hartman, State
Taxation in Interstate Commerce, 7 VAND. L. REV. 138 (1956); Hellerstein, State Franchise
Taxation of Interstate Businesses, 4 TAX L. Rv. 95 (1948); Note, State Taxation and Inter-
state Commerce, 54 COL. L. Rav. 261 (1954).
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state jurisdiction and apportionment rules have hitherto been un-
successful.8 Additionally, some state tax administrators have
adopted the Multistate Tax Compact.' Although the Compact rep-
resents a significant step towards standardizing the technical rules
of the apportionment formulae, there remains a divergence of views
as to what constitutes a unitary business. Only when this concept
is clearly defined can income apportionment be validly applied.
The Supreme Court now has an opportunity to clarify this area, as
two cases dealing with this issue are pending before the Court.'0
Part II of this comment will discuss the objectives and constitu-
tional issues to be considered in developing a definition of the uni-
tary business concept. An in-depth analysis of this concept is
presented in part I. The origin of the unitary business concept
will be traced to the early property tax and income tax cases, and
the current state definitions of unitary business will be examined
and compared. Part IV will briefly describe the methods used for
dividing the income of a multistate business. The methods will be
contrasted and their relationship to the unitary business concept
explained. The conclusion will summarize the discussion in part III
and propose a definition of a unitary business.
8. These efforts have been reflected in numerous bills introduced in almost every session
of Congress throughout the last fourteen years. Bills now before the Congress include H.R. 5,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)(Rodino Bill), reprinted in [1977] ALL STATES TAX GUIDE (P-H)
§§ 901, 945-2; S. 983, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)(Mathias Bill).
Except for the Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-272, 73 Stat. 555 (1959)(current ver-
sion at 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-84 (1976)), the power of the Congress to regulate state taxation of
interstate commerce has been unexercised. Pub. L. No. 86-272 prohibits the states from im-
posing income taxes on foreign corporations if interstate operations within the taxing state
constitute minimal activities. Id. See Hartman, "Solicitation" and "Delivery" Under Public
Law 86-272: An Uncharted Course, 29 VAND. L. REv. 353 (1976); Hellerstein, State Taxation
Under the Commerce Clause: An Historical Perspective, 29 VAND. L. REv. 335 (1976) [here-
inafter cited as State Taxation].
9. The Multi-State Tax Compact, reprinted in [1967] STATE & Loc. TAXES, ALL STATES
UNIT (P-H) 6310-68 [hereinafter cited as MTCI, adopts the UNIFORM DMVISION OF INCOME
FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT reprinted in [19671 STATE & Loc. TAXES, ALL STATES UNIT (P-H)
6100-6286 [hereinafter cited as UDITPA]. The UDITPA provides a set of uniform rules of
apportionment and allocation of income. See also Note, The Constitutionality of the Multis-
tate Tax Compact, 29 VAND. L. REv. 453 (1976). As of 1979, twenty states are parties to the
Multi-State Tax Compact. They are: Alabama (subject to legislative consent), Alaska,
Arkansas; California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Ne-
braska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, and
Washington. See [1977] ALL STATES TAX GUIDE (P-H) 564.
10. Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 90 Wis.2d 700, 281 N.W.2d 94, prob.
juris. noted, 100 S. Ct. 446 (1979); Exxon Corp. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 258 S.E.2d
93 (S.C.), prob. juris. noted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3458 (U.S. Nov. 30, 1979) (No. 79-843).
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II. The Unitary Business Concept and the Constitution
A definition of a unitary business should accommodate two
objectives in state taxation of multistate businesses. The first ob-
jective is to ascertain whether the practical effects of the definition
are acceptable on constitutional grounds; the second is to minimize
the risk of multiple taxation while providing for the revenue needs
of the state.
A. The Due Process Clause
The due process clause states that no state may take property
without due process of law." Under this stricture, a state may tax
those persons or entities over which its protection and control ex-
tend,"2 including foreign corporations."8 In general, a state may tax
net income derived from sources within the state. 4 Income from
business activities is deemed to have its source in the state where
the activities are conducted. Sufficient activity must exist within
the state in order to form the jurisdictional nexus 5 required for in-
come taxation of operations conducted outside the state. 6 For a
unitary business, this jurisdictional nexus is satisfied by that por-
tion of its activities which are located within the taxing state. Be-
cause a unitary business' operations are so interrelated as to consti-
tute a single business, that portion of unitary income reasonably
attributable to the taxing state is regarded as having its source
within the state. 7 If this attribution of income is accomplished by
a reasonable formula 8 designed to reach income derived from
within the state, it will satisfy the due process clause."' Such a
formula should account for the reciprocal earnings effect of the in-
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
12. Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123 (1931); Shaffer v. Carter, 252
U.S. 37 (1920).
13. Northwestern Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 464 (1959); West Publishing
Co. v. McColgan, 27 Cal. 2d 705, 711-13, 166 P.2d 861, 864-65, aff'd per curiam, 328 U.S. 823
(1946). A foreign corporation is one which is incorporated outside the taxing state.
14. See cases cited in notes 12-13 supra.
15. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
16. Id. See also BEAMAN, supra note 3, ch. 7, at 7-6.
17. See, e.g., Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501'(1942); Underwood Typewriter Co.
v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 103 (1920); John Deere Plow Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 38 Cal. 2d
214, 238 P.2d 659, appeal dismissed, 343 U.S. 939 (1951).
18. See pt. IV infra.
19. See, e.g., Northwestern Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959); Underwood
Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920).
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state and out-of-state operations so that the income reached by the
taxing state arises "out of or [is] connected with the activities
within the taxing state." 0 This will permit the state to tax only
those income items attributable to the "local activities within the
taxing state."'" In meeting his burden of proof2 when challenging
the apportionment, the taxpayer has traditionally used separate
accounting to demonstrate the unfairness of the apportionment.
This method of attack has been rendered ineffective by the Su-
preme Court."
B. The Commerce Clause
The Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of the commerce
clause is to "resolve a conflict between the Constitution's mandate
that trade between the states be permitted to flow freely without
unnecessary obstruction from any source, and the state's rightful
desire to require that interstate business bear its proper share of the
costs of local government in return for benefits received."'" While
the current trend of commerce clause cases is far from stable,"
there are some "firm peaks of decision which remain unques-
tioned. '2
It is established that a state may not levy a tax on the privilege
of engaging in interstate commerce.27 In addition, the states are not
allowed "one single-tax-worth of direct interference with the free
flow of commerce. ' 2 State taxation of unitary businesses, due ei-
ther to inconsistent definitions or inconsistent treatment of a uni-
tary business, may result in multiple taxation of such businesses."
This is illustrated by the experience of Kennecott Copper Corpora-
tion in two recent cases.
20. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 325 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
21. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 452 (1959).
22. See ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 99 Idaho 924, 592 P.2d 39, appeal
docketed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3031 (U.S. June 8, 1979) (No. 78-1839); Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v.
North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123 (1931). See also note 44 infra for a discussion of burdens of
proof in property tax cases.
23. ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 99 Idaho 924, 592 P.2d 39, appeal dock-
eted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3031 (U.S. June 8, 1979) (No. 78-1839).
24. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157, 166 (1954).
25. See State Taxation, supra note 8, at 346-48.
26. 358 U.S. at 458.
27. Id.
28. Id.; Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 256 (1946).
29. State Taxation, supra note 8, at 346-48.
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In Chase Brass & Copper Co. v. Franchise Tax Board,' the
plaintiff, a Connecticut corporation and a subsidiary of Kennecott
Copper Corporation, was engaged in the manufacture of brass,
bronze and copper products. While manufacturing was done en-
tirely outside of California, Chase Brass warehoused and sold its
manufactured products within the state." The parent corporation,
Kennecott Copper, has three other subsidiaries: Kennecott Sales,
Braden Copper and Bear Creek Mining. Kennecott Sales, a New
York corporation, markets the copper extracted by Kennecott Cop-
per. Kennecott Sales and Kennecott Copper supplied the copper
needed by Chase Brass. However, the products which entered Cali-
fornia were manufactured elsewhere. No sales were made by Ken-
necott Copper and Kennecott Sales in California.2 Braden Copper
and Kennecott Wire and Cable were engaged in mining or manu-
facture. All their products were sold by Kennecott Sales. None of
them did business in California. Bear Creek Mining was a Dela-
ware corporation which explored for metals in California, but made
no significant discoveries."3
California taxed the plaintiff and its affiliates as a unitary busi-
ness. Chase Brass, the plaintiff, attacked this treatment on due
process grounds. It argued that it gained no particular advantage
by reason of the parentage of Kennecott. The court examined the
business by using the three unities concept3' and found unity of
operations in purchasing, advertising, accounting, legal, financing
and retirement plans. Unity of use was found in the executive
forces. The court concluded that Kennecott Copper, Kennecott
Sales, and Chase Brass constituted a unitary business doing busi-
ness in the state of California.
Two years later, the same parent company was the plaintiff in
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Commission."3 Utah taxed
Kennecott on a separate accounting basis, in effect treating one di-
vision of Kennecott as a separate business. Kennecott vigorously
argued that it was being whipsawed by the inconsistent treatment
accorded it by Utah and California. The Utah Supreme Court up-
30. 10 Cal. App. 3d 496, 95 Cal. Rptr. 805, appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 961 (1970).
31. Id. at 501, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 807.
32. Id. at 500, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 806.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 502, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 807. See notes 72-82 infra and accompanying text.
35. 27 Utah 2d 119, 493 P.2d 632 (1972).
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held the tax commission. The taxpayer appealed to the Supreme
Court. The State of California joined and filed an amicus brief,
urging reversal of the Utah decision. The Supreme Court denied
certiorari.'
Such conflicting methods of division of tax bases which result in
taxation of more than one hundred percent of the base are inequi-
table to multistate businesses. Given this diversity in definitions
and treatments of unitary businesses, such businesses are open to
the risk of multiple taxation. Because no definitive guidelines have
been offered by the Supreme Court or Congress on the treatment of
a unitary business, the Kennecott experience may well happen
again. This is precisely the type of burden on interstate commerce
that the commerce clause is designed to prevent.
III. The Unitary Business Concept
A. Origin of the Unitary Business Concept
1. Property Tax Cases
The origin of the unitary business concept in tax cases can be
traced to early property tax cases. 7 In Pullman's Palace Car Co. v.
Pennsylvannia,5 the taxpayer was a railroad car company. Its tan-
gible property consisted mainly of train cars located in various
states. The cars were moved by railroad carriers under contract.
The property was termed "rolling stock" because the cars con-
stantly moved around. Pennsylvania devised the "unit rule" to im-
pose a property tax on the company's property, including rolling
stock, within the state. The property value was obtained by multi-
plying the company's capital stock by the ratio of local mileage to
total car mileage. The unit rule was so named because the entire
rolling stock, franchise and capital of the company was regarded as
the unit of taxation. The taxpayer attacked the assessment on due
process grounds. The Supreme Court upheld the assessment on the
theory that "the whole property of the company might be regarded
36. 409 U.S. 973 (1972). Presumably, California's action was taken to buttress that
state's unitary apportionment approach.
37. See, e.g., Cleveland, Cin., Chi. & St. L. Ry. v. Backus, 154 U.S. 439 (1894); Pitts-
burgh, Cin., Chi. & St. L. Ry. v. Backus, 154 U.S. 421 (1894); Maine v. Grand Truck Ry.,
142 U.S. 217 (1891); Pullman's Palace Car. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1890); Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Massachusetts, 125 U.S. 530 (1887); Kentucky R.R. Tax Cases, 115 U.S.
321 (1885); State R.R. Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575 (1875).
38. 141 U.S. 18 (1890).
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as a unit plant, with a unit value, a proportionate part of which
value might be reached by the state authorities on the basis indi-
cated.""' The controversial aspect of this rule is its premise that
local value embodies not only the physical worth of a company's
property, but also a portion of its intangible value.'"
The unitary concept was more clearly enunciated in Adams Ex-
press Co. v. Ohio." The taxpayer was an express company which
operated its transportation business in several states. Its property
included horses, wagons and furniture distributed in the different
states. The express company challenged Ohio's unit rule of assess-
ment on constitutional grounds. The Court considered what consti-
tuted a unitary business. It stated:
Doubtless there is a distinction between the property of railroad and tele-
graph companies and that of express companies. The physical unity existing
in the former is lacking in the latter; but there is the same unity in the use
of the entire property for the specific purpose, and there are the same ele-
ments of value arising from such use . . . .The unit is a unit of use and
management, and the horses, wagons, safes, pouches and furniture; the con-
tracts for transportation facilities; the capital necessary to carry on the busi-
ness, whether represented in tangible or intangible property, in Ohio, pos-
sessed a value in combination and from use in connection with the property
and capital elsewhere, which could as rightfully be recognized in the as-
sessment for taxation in the instance of these companies as the others.
We repeat that while unity which exists may not be a physical unity, it is
something more than a mere unity of ownership. It is a unity of use, not
simply for the convenience or pecuniary profit of the owner, but existing in
the very necessities of the case - resulting from the very nature of the
business."
Therefore, the single specific use of the properties united together
gave rise to the classification of the company as a unitary business.
Notably, the Court recognized that under special circumstances13
some property of the company may not be used in connection with
the unitary business. However, the "unit rule" of assessment was
39. Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, 165 U.S. 194, 221-23, rehearing denied, 166 U.S. 185
(1897).
40. For further application of the unit rule to transportation companies, see Schwab v.
Richardson, 263 U.S. 88 (1923); American Refrig. Transit Co. v. Hall, 174 U.S. 70 (1899).
41. 165 U.S. 194 (1897); see also Adams Express Co. v. Indiana, 165 U.S. 255 (1897).
42. 165 U.S. at 221-22.
43. See Pittsburgh, Cin. Chi. & St. L. Ry. v. Backus, 154 U.S. 421 (1894) (property sepa-
rate and distinct in character located outside the taxing state).
826 [Vol. VIII
UNITARY BUSINESSES
upheld in this case because no such special circumstances were
present."
2. Income Tax and Franchise Tax Cases
The "unit rule" of assessment developed in the property tax
cases was later extended to the area of income and franchise taxa-
tion of integrated manufacturing and selling enterprises.15 In Un-
derwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain," the corporation, incorpo-
rated in Delaware, had its principal office in New York, all its
manufacturing facilities in Connecticut and branch offices and
warehouses in other states. Under the Connecticut statute, Under-
wood's taxable income was allocated to the state based on a single
factor property formula. Because forty-seven percent of Under-
wood's property was located in the state, the formula resulted in an
allocation of forty-seven percent of the corporate income to Con-
necticut. Most of Underwood's sales were made outside Connecti-
cut. Based on the low volume of sales consummated in the state,
the taxpayer contended that only 3.3 percent of its net income was
received in Connecticut. Plaintiff, in the lower court, challenged
the statute on the grounds that it imposed an undue burden upon
interstate business, and attempted to tax income arising from busi-
.ness conducted outside the taxing state.'7 Renewing this argument
in the Supreme Court, the Court nonetheless rejected the com-
44. 165 U.S. at 227. In the Adams case, the Court presumed that "all the property of the
corporation or company is held and used for the purposes of its business . . . ." Id. The
taxpayer had the burden of proof to show such special circumstances to rebut the presump-
tion. Id. In later cases, the burden seems to have shifted. In Norfolk & West. Ry. v. Missouri
State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317 (1968), the taxpayer showed evidence that the equalized
value of its rolling stock in Missouri was much less than that computed by formula. The
Court stated that Missouri had to counter such evidence by disproving the disproportionate
result of its formula. Id. at 317. Later, the Court was alert to strike down the property tax
statutes when it found that apportionment resulted in the taxation of out-of-state values. Cf.
Britton, State Taxation of Extraterritorial Value: Allocation of Sales to Destination, 46 VA.
L. REv. 1160 (1960).
45. See, e.g., Western Cartridge Co. v. Emmerson, 281 U.S. 511 (1930); Hump Hairpin v.
Emmerson, 258 U.S. 290 (1922); Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412 (1937).
See Issacs, The Unit Rule, 35 YALE L.J. 838 (1926). For a more detailed discussion of these
cases, see Goldstein, Allocation of Income for Purpose of Corporate Taxation, 1 TAx L. REV.
149 (1946); Brooks, Allocation of Income for Purposes of Corporate Taxation - Another View,
2 TAx L. RTv. 72 (1946); Goldstein, Allocation of Income for Purpose of Corporate Taxation -
A Reply, 2 TAx L. Rv. 80 (1946); Hellerstein, Recent Developments in State Tax Appor-
tionment and the Circumscription of Unitary Business, 21 NAT'L TAx J. 487 (1968).
46. 254 U.S. 113 (1920).
47. Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 92 Conn. 199, 102 A. 600 (1917).
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merce clause argument by noting the clearly established rule that
income taxation of interstate commerce is permissible."8 Addressing
the due process objection, the Court analyzed the nature of the
business. 9 The Court discussed the unit rule of valuation used in
property taxation on property employed as an integral part of an
interstate transportation system. It observed that "the profits of
the corporation were largely earned by a series of transactions be-
ginning with manufacture in Connecticut and ending with sale in
other states."0 This was noted as typical of manufacturing busi-
nesses. Because of the manner in which income was earned, the
Court stated that the legislature was "faced with the impossibility
of allocating specifically the profits earned by the processes con-
ducted within its borders." 5' The Court concluded that Connecti-
cut's formula was designed to reach only profits earned within the
state. Therefore, the state's statute was upheld.5" In Underwood,
the critical fact supporting the finding of a unitary business was
that the income of the multistate business was earned by a single,
continuous "series of transactions. '3
This same rationale led to the finding of a unitary business in
Bass, Ratliff and Gretton v. State Tax Commission,5' decided in
1924. The taxpayer, a British corporation, manufactured ale in Eng-
land. The ale was then sold in both England and the United
States. Sales in the United States were made through branches in
Chicago and New York. The combined worldwide operations
showed a substantial profit, but its United States operations
showed a loss. Presumably, this result was reached by computing
income under the separate accounting method. 5 New York's appor-
tionment statute employed a single factor formula like that in Un-
derwood.5 The taxpayer's worldwide net income was used as the
tax base for the formula apportionment. As a consequence, profits
were attributed to New York although the United States operations
reported a loss under separate accounting. In sustaining the appor-
48. 254 U.S. at 119-20.
49. Id. at 120-21.
50. Id. at 120.
51. Id. at 121.
52. Id. at 121-22.
53. Id. at 120.
54. 266 U.S. 271 (1924).
55. See pt. IV infra.
56. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
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tionment, the Court stressed the fact that Bass, Ratliff & Gretton
was engaged in a unitary business, and found the fact that some
income was from a foreign source irrelevant. In finding a unitary
business, the Court seized the language used in Underwood. It
stated that Bass's profits were earned by "a series of transactions
beginning with manufacture in England and ending in sales in New
York and other places - the process of manufacturing resulting in
no profits until it ends in sales . . . .""
The Bass, Ratliff case is significant because the Court specifi-
cally refers to the unit rule concept employed in property taxation
as "directly applicable to the carrying on of a unitary business of
manufacture and sale partly within and partly without the
State.""8 Thus, the stage was set for the subsequent articulation of
the unitary business concept in the area of state taxation of multi-
state businesses.
In Hans Rees' Sons v. North Carolina," a New York corporation
was engaged in the business of tanning, manufacturing, and selling
belting and other heavy leathers. Its manufacturing operations
were conducted exclusively in North Carolina. The company main-
tained its sales office and a warehouse in New York. Its products
were sold at the wholesale and retail level throughout the United
States, Canada, and Western Europe. Approximately forty percent
of the output of its manufacturing plant in North Carolina was
shipped to the New York warehouse; the balance was shipped di-
rectly to customers upon order from the New York sales office.
North Carolina treated the taxpayer's multistate operations as a
unitary business for tax purposes. Using a single factor property
formula, the state apportioned approximately eighty percent of the
corporate income to North Carolina. Asserting the invalidity of the
formula, the taxpayer offered evidence to show that its net income
was comprised of buying, manufacturing, and selling profit and
that only seventeen percent of its income was derived from the
manufacturing and tanning operations within North Carolina."
This evidence was stricken by the trial court. The state supreme
57. 266 U.S. at 282.
58. Id. The Bass case involved a franchise tax rather than an income tax. While the
opinion seems to attach some importance to the nature of the tax, it is doubtful that the
distinction is of significance.
59. 283 U.S. 123 (1931).
60. Id. at 127.
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court sustained the ruling of the trial court, but held that even if
the evidence were deemed to be competent it would not change the
result.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court viewed the case as
if the evidence had been received by the state court as true and
accurate but as having no bearing on the validity of the apportion-
ment in question. 1 The taxpayer's objection was premised upon
both the due process and commerce clauses. The Court noted that
in state tax-apportionment cases evidence can always be received
to show a state had applied a method reaching profits which are
in no just sense attributable to transactions within its jurisdic-
tion. The Court held that the taxpayer had carried his burden of
proof and found the North Carolina apportionment unreasonable.2
Under the standards established in the Underwood and Bass,
Ratliff cases, the taxpayer in Hans Rees' Sons clearly conducted a
unitary business. Its worldwide net income was earned through a
series of transactions beginning from manufacturing in North Caro-
lina and ending in sales throughout the United States, Canada and
Western Europe. However, in setting aside the North Carolina ap-
portionment and allowing separate accounting, the Court never
reached the question whether Hans Rees' Sons was engaged in a
unitary business. Rather, the formula apportionment was overruled
because its result was unreasonable, owing to the peculiar procedu-
ral twist in the case.63
In Butler Brothers v. McColgan," the Supreme Court gave fuller
expression to the role of the unitary concept and the contrasts be-
tween separate accounting and formula apportionment. Here, the
taxpayer, an Illinois corporation, engaged in the wholesale dry
goods and merchandising business. It operated seven wholesale
stores in seven states, including one in California. Each of the
seven locations served a separate territory with its own sales per-
sons, handled its own collections and credit arrangements, and kept
its own accounts. All of the sales in California were handled by its
61. Id. at 135.
62. Id.
63. For further analyses and comments on later developments, see Palestin, Interstate
Taxation: Non-Unitary Corporation - Should Statutory Apportionment Yield to Separate
Accounting?, reprinted in NAT'L TAX ASS'N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL CON-
FERENCE 531 (1965); Beaman, supra note 3, ch. 3; Cohen, State Tax Allocations and Formu-
las Which Affect Management Operating Decisions, 1 J. TAX. 2 (1954).
64. 315 U.S. 501 (1942), aff'g 17 Cal. 2d 664, 111 P.2d 334 (1941).
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San Francisco office. All purchases made by the San Francisco of-
fice came from the company's home office in Chicago. Charges for
the goods were made to each location at cost plus transportation
expenses. Operating and advertising costs for the central purchas-
ing division were allocated among the seven wholesale stores. Al-
though the business as a whole realized a profit, the California op-
erations showed a loss. This loss was computed by the taxpayer
using a separate accounting method. California treated Butler
Brothers as a unitary business and used a formula to allocate a
portion of the taxpayer's overall profit to the state. The taxpayer
contended that the California formula resulted in an allocation of
out-of-state income to the taxing state in violation of the due pro-
cess clause.
The Supreme Court's decision relied upon the unit rule devel-
oped earlier in the property tax cases. The Court articulated the
analogy to which it had alluded in Underwood Typewriter Co. and
Bass, Ratliff & Gretton.11 The Court held that Butler Brothers was
a unitary business and upheld the California apportionment
formula.
A critical factor in the Court's holding was Butler Brothers' use
of a central purchasing division. This system enabled it to obtain
lower prices than would be possible for the individual branches.
The Court noted that this mode of operation alone would indicate
that the branches' functions were "closely integrated."66 The sav-
ings afforded by the lower purchasing prices were reflected in the
lower costs to each branch, and undoubtedly contributed to the net
profit of the business. 7
In sustaining the application of the unitary business concept the
Court emphasized the unity of ownership and management which
characterized the taxpayer's interstate business operations. The
65. See notes 46 & 54 supra and accompanying text.
66. 315 U.S. at 508.
67. The predominant advantage of centralized management in this case was of course
the discounts afforded by central purchasing. The Court however did not enumerate what
"other advantages" there may be. Id. at 509. To attack the apportionment, the taxpayer had
to prove that the California branch did not contribute to the overall profit. A fatal defect in
the taxpayer's case was the failure to show how much of the volume purchase savings was
contributed by the California branch. Apparently an attempt to carry this proof could be
made by determining the purchase prices available to small purchasers. The difference be-
tween these higher prices and Hans Rees' discounted prices represented the total savings.
The California store's contribution to this savings can be based on the ratio of its purchases
(or inventory) to total purchases.
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Supreme Court concluded that California was justified in assuming
that the branch contributed its share to the "advantages of central-
ized management of this unitary enterprise and to the net income
earned.""8
Butler Brothers is significant because it was the first Supreme
Court case to apply the unitary business concept to a non-inte-
grated business. The Supreme Court has not comprehensively dis-
cussed the unitary business concept since the Butler Brothers case.
The subsequent application of the concept has been made by the
state courts.
B. State Definitions of a Unitary Business
The burden of refining and developing the unitary business con-
cept has fallen largely on the state courts. The Supreme Court has,
up the present, provided only broad guidelines." The task is made
more complex because the states must deal not only with federal
constitutional issues, 0 but also with state constitutional and statu-
tory law. Because of the wide latitude states have in applying divi-
68. Id.
69. See Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271 (1924); Under-
wood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 133 (1920); John Deere Plow Co. v. Franchise
Tax Bd., 38 Cal. 2d 214, 238 P.2d 569 (1951), appeal dismissed, 343 U.S. 939 (1952); Butler
Bros. v. McColgan, 17 Cal. 2d 664, 111 P.2d 334 (1941), aff'd, 315 U.S. 501 (1942). In a
recently decided case, Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont, 48 U.S.L.W.
4306 (Mar. 19, 1980), the Supreme Court considered the unitary business concept. In this
case, Vermont included Mobil's dividend income from overseas subsidiaries in its preappor-
tionment tax base. This treatment assumes that the dividend was derived from a unitary
business, part of which was conducted within Vermont. The Court stated that appellant's
procedural position before it made unnecessary a discussion of the unitary business concept.
Mobil, the Court stated, "confined [itself] to the question whether there is something about
the character of income earned from investments in affiliates and subsidiaries operating
abroad that precludes, as a constitutional matter, state taxation of that income by the ap-
portionment method." Id. at 4308. On that issue the Court upheld the Supreme Court of
Vermont's holding that such income may be included in the corporation's tax base. J. Ste-
vens, dissenting, argued that the procedural and substantive issues were "inherent [ly] inter-
dependent." "The question whether Vermont may include investment income in the appor-
tionable tax base should not be answered in the abstract without consideration of the other
factors in the allocation formula. The apportionable tax base is but one multiplicand in the
formula. Appellant's challenge to the inclusion of investment income in the component nec-
essarily carries with it a challenge to the product." Id. at 4316. J. Stevens argued that the
dividend income should not be included in the tax base because the corporations from which
Mobil derived the income were neither engaged in the petroleum business nor had any con-
nection with Mobil's marketing business in Vermont. Id. at 4315.
70. See pt. II supra.
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sion of income rules," there are conflicting views as to the defini-
tion of a unitary business.
The tests employed by the states follow two general approaches.
The first approach focuses on the operational relationships between
the activities in the tax jurisdiction and the activities outside the
jurisdiction. The second approach stresses the economic relation-
ships between the in-state and the out-of-state activities.
1. Operational Tests
a. The Three Unities of Ownership, Operation and Use
A popular definition of a unitary business was first enunciated by
the California Supreme Court in the Butler Brothers case" and has
been applied in a variety of cases. 3 A unitary business was defined
in Butler Brothers as one in which there is unity of ownership,
operation, and use." Unity of ownership means that the activities
outside the tax jurisdiction, combined with the in-state operations,
are owned by the same taxpayer. 5 Unity of operation may be evi-
denced by central purchasing, advertising, accounting, and
management divisions. 6 Unity of use is found in a centralized ex-
ecutive force and a general system of operation." Butler Brothers
did not discuss what combination of these requirements is neces-
sary to comprise a unitary business.The three unities rule was applied in Edison California Stores,
Inc. v. McColgan.75 In that case, a multistate retail shoe business
was operated through a Delaware parent corporation with its head-
quarters in St. Louis. The corporation was comprised of fifteen
wholly-owned subsidiary corporations, each operating in its state of
incorporation. The parent provided centralized management,
purchasing, advertising, and other centralized administrative func-
71. See International Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U.S. 416, 422-23 (1947).
72. Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 17 Cal. 2d 664, 678, 111 P.2d 334, 341 (1941). See notes 64-
68 supra and accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., Wurlitzer Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 35 N.Y.2d 100, 315 N.E.2d 805, 358
N.Y.S.2d 762 (1974); Honolulu Oil Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 60 Cal. 2d 417, 386 P.2d 40,
34 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1963); W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co. v. Dickinson, 200 Tenn. 25, 289
S.W.2d 533 (1956).
74. Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 17 Cal.2d 664, 111 P.2d 334 (1941). See John Deere Plow
Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 38 Cal. 2d 214, 228, 229, 238 P.2d 569, 577 (1951).
75. Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 17 Cal. 2d 664, 111 P.2d 334, 341 (1941).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. 30 Cal. 2d 472, 183 P.2d 16 (1947).
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tions. The home office determined operating policies for the entire
affiliated group and maintained the principal accounting records
for all subsidiaries. Goods purchased by the central purchasing di-
vision were shipped to the various stores operated by the subsidiar-
ies, which were charged with the cost and a portion of general over-
head expenses. Each subsidiary operated solely within the
geographical confines of its particular state. The California tax
commissioner regarded the entire business, comprising the parent
and all of its subsidiaries, as a unitary business. The taxpayer ob-
jected on the grounds that the unit rule did not apply to separate
corporate entities." The court rejected this argument and held that
the corporate veil of each corporation could not cloak the existence
of an integrated multistate unitary business enterprise. In finding a
unitary business, the California Supreme Court stated that:
In the present case all of the elements of a unitary business are present -
unity of ownership, unity of operation by centralized purchasing, manage-
ment, advertising and accounting, and unity of use in the centralized execu-
tive force and general system of operation. The business of the parent and
all of its subsidiaries is owned and managed under one centralized system,
to the same extent as in the Butler Brothers case and other cases considered
therein. Thus the business is unitary regardless of the fact that in the Butler
Brothers case there was but one corporation involved . . . and that in the
present case there is a parent corporation owning and controlling as units of
one system fifteen different branches organized as corporations .,.. .0
Significantly, the court in Edison California Stores added that the
business is unitary where the business done within the state is de-
pendent upon or contributes to the operations of the business with-
out the state. Where no such dependency exists, the business
within the state must be considered as separate.5 ' As applied by
the California Supreme Court in Butler Brothers, the three unities
rule is overly formalistic and fails to account for the relationship of
the business to the taxing jurisdiction. The rule is applicable not
only to a business carried on wholly within a state, but also to a
business operated partially within the state. The California court's
approach fails in the ultimate objective of providing an appropriate
79. Id. at 479-80, 183 P.2d at 17, 21-22.
80. Id. at 479-80, 183 P.2d at 21.
81. Id. at 481, 183 P.2d at 16. For a comprehensive discussion of the unitary concept as
applied to affiliated corporations, see Rudolph, State Taxation of Interstate Business: The
Unitary Business Concept and Affiliated Corporate Groups, 25 TAx L. Rav. 171 (1970).
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method of income division. In contrast, the United States Supreme
Court's decision in the same case stressed the significant savings
generated by the fact of operating a store in the taxing state.82 This
approach focuses more clearly on the out-of-state's contribution to
the in-state operation.
b. The "Dependent Upon or Contributory" Test
In defining unitary business, Professors Altman and Keesling,
authors of a leading treatise in this field, declared that "[t]he es-
sential test is whether or not the operation of the business within
the state is dependent upon or contributory to the operation of the
business outside the state."83 As noted earlier,8 the court in Edison
California Stores used this test in conjunction with the three uni-
ties test. This test has been widely used in many states. Its appli-
cation can be illustrated by the case of Coca Cola Co. v. Depart-
ment of Revenue.5 The taxpayer was a Delaware corporation
engaged in the manufacture of soft drink syrups for fountain and
bottled use. The syrups were sold to wholesale dealers and to ap-
proximately 900 bottling plants throughout the United States.
Coca Cola owned all the shares of forty of the 900 bottling plants,
including Pacific Coca Cola Bottling Company, located in Port-
land, Oregon. Approximately ten percent of the. syrup manufac-
tured by the taxpayer was sold to its subsidiaries' bottling plants.
Coca Cola owned and operated a Portland syrup plant which sup-
plied Pacific with its syrup. It was one of twelve plants in the
United States preparing Coca Cola syrup using a secret formula.
Sales of the syrup to "independent bottlers" and wholly owned bot-
tling companies were made at the same prices. Pacific's contract
with Coca Cola prohibited it from buying syrup and bottling bever-
ages from any other manufacturer. Coca Cola retained control over
the nature and quality of the product, advertising, marketing
methods, research and development, maintenance and audit of
books and records, and the geographical area to be served.
The Oregon Supreme Court, using the dependent upon or con-
82. See 315 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1942). The California Supreme Court did not stress this
factor. 17 Cal. 2d 664, 678, 111 P.2d 334, 341 (1941).
83. ALTMAN & KEESLING, supra note 3, at 101; see Goldstein, Allocation of Income for
Purposes of Corporate Taxation, 1 TAx L. Riv. 149 (1946).
84. See notes 78-82 supra and accompanying text.
85. 271 Or. App. 517, 533 P.2d 788 (1975).
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tributory test, 8 held that the Oregon operations were part of a uni-
tary business. The court found that Pacific was dependent upon
Coca Cola for all of its supplies and for the management guidance
described above. Pacific's contribution to the overall operation of
Coca Cola was its purchase of syrup and bottling beverages. The
court noted that but for the fact that common ownership was miss-
ing between Coca Cola and the "independent bottlers," the inde-
pendent companies would also be included in the unitary business.
This "dependent upon or contributory" test has been criticized
as inadequate by Messrs. Keesling and Warren87 because the test
does not clearly indicate that the relationship between the business
and the taxing jurisdiction is the sole criterion for distinguishing
between separate and unitary business; that is, the business must
be conducted partly within and without the taxing jurisdiction.
They suggest the word "dependent" is confusing and misleading.8
If the operations within a state are only dependent upon the opera-
tions out of the state and do not contribute to the earnings of in-
come, it is argued that they should not be credited with any por-
tion of the income derived from productive activities outside the
state.8 This position is sound. Application of the dependent upon
test would capture income from a company's out-of-state opera-
tions which derived no benefit, or more precisely income, from the
in-state operations. In addition, this test fails to achieve the objec-
tive of formula apportionment because it only considers the mode
of operations, and does not take into account the earnings effect of
the in- and out-of-state operations. Where the only connection be-
tween the operations is that the in-state business is dependent
upon the out-of-state business only, the corporation should not be
considered a unitary business.
c. Interdependence of Operating Units
Some courts look to the relationship between the operating units
in the determination of a unitary business. Operating units are
those divisions of a business engaged in direct income activities,
such as producing and selling. Non-operating units are those en-
86. Id. at 524, 533 P.2d at 792.
87. Keesling & Warren, The Unitary Concept in the Allocation of Income, 12 HASTINGS
L.J. 42, 48 (1960).
88. Id.
89. Id.
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gaged in support and management functions, such as accounting,
research, and development. Pennsylvania, for example, follows the
"interdependence of operating units" test closely.'"
In Commonwealth v. ACF Industries, Inc.," the taxpayer was a
New Jersey corporation with its headquarters in New York. In
Pennsylvania, ACF Industries manufactured railroad and tank
cars, pressed steel and pressure vessels, repaired freight and tank
cars, and sold other products. These activities, as well as certain
aerospace and nuclear engineering operations, were also conducted
outside Pennsylvania. Before 1960, ACF Industries engaged in sev-
eral joint business activities with Republic Aviation Corporation.
Such joint ventures included the submission of a joint bid to
NASA involving flight testing of nuclear rocket propulsion systems,
the manufacture and sale of F-105 fighter planes to the federal gov-
ernment by Republic, and the construction of flight simulators to
train pilots on the F-105 planes by ACF Industries. In 1960, ACF
Industries purchased some shares of stock of Republic in the hope
of aquiring the latter. In 1961, ACF Industries abandoned the plan
of acquisition and sold the stock at a five million dollar gain. The
issue presented to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was whether
the sale of the Republic stock related to the conduct of a unitary
business in Pennsylvania.
The court found that the purchase of the Republic stock was an
isolated investment designed to motivate a study of possible corpo-
rate combination, that the F-105 contracts were unrelated events
entered into two years before the stock purchase, and that the
stock, when held, did not contribute to, nor was related to, ACF's
business in Pennsylvania. The court held that because of the lack
of interdependence between the holding of the stock and the op-
erations in Pennsylvania, the purchase, holding, and sale of the
Republic stock was not part of the unitary business in Pennsyl-
vania. In dictum, the court stated:
[I1t is virtually impossible to envision a successful multiform claim based
upon a separation of vertical functions of a corporation where the selling
90. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Advance-Wilson Indus., Inc., 456 Pa. 200, 317 A.2d 642
(1974); Commonwealth v. ACF Indus., Inc., 441 Pa. 129, 271 A.2d 273 (1970); Common-
wealth v. Ford Motor Co., 350 Pa. 236, 38 A.2d 329 (1944); Commonwealth v. Quaker Oats
Co., 350 Pa. 253, 38 A.2d 325 (1944); Commonwealth v. Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co., 11
Pa. Commw. Ct. 629, 315 A.2d 346 (1974); Morewood Realty Corp. v. Commonwealth, 6 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 244, 294 A.2d 219 (1972), aff'd, 458 Pa. 204, 327 A.2d 328 (1974).
91. 441 Pa. 129, 271 A.2d 273 (1970).
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function deals in the products of the manufacturing and/or wholesaling
functions ... [Plerformance by the corporate whole of policy, administra-
tive, research and similar functions for otherwise independently operated
units does not vitiate multiformity any more than does their common but
independent contributions of benefits to the corporate whole."
This view recognizes that a company which is completely inte-
grated is typically a unitary business. This follows from the fact
that net income is a result of various activities and transactions
culminating in sales. It is therefore not possible to determine what
part of that net income is attributable to the integrated activities
of manufacture, sale, and distribution.
d. Interdependence at a Management or Supporting Function
Level
Where interdependence is lacking at the operating units level
some courts hold that an interdependence at the management or
supporting functions level will support the finding of a unitary busi-
ness. Management functions are those typically performed at the
executive level. Such functions include policy formulation, fiscal
control, and financing. Supporting functions are those which are
not typically part of the production or marketing process. For ex-
ample, in a manufacturing and selling concern, the supporting
functions would include the providing of legal counsel, accounting
services, technical, and laboratory assistance. These functions are
similar to the unity of operation and use requirements in Butler
Brothers v. McColgan"' where the supporting function was the cen-
tral purchasing of goods to be sold at the operating level.
In Superior Oil Co. v. Franchise Tax Board, 5 an expansive view
of a unitary business was taken by finding interdependence at the
management and supporting services level. Superior was not an in-
92. Id. at 141-42, 271 A.2d at 279.
93. Cf. Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920); Bass, Ratcliff &
Bretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271 (1924), where the Court mentioned
integration.
94. 315 U.S. 501 (1942), aff'g 17 Cal. 2d 664, 111 P.2d 334 (1941). See notes 64-68 supra
and accompanying text.
95. 60 Cal. 2d 406, 386 P.2d 33, 34 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1963). California is a stronghold of the
unitary concept. For other California cases, see Appeal of F.W. Woolworth Co., [1972] CAL.
TAX REP. (CCH) 204-806; Chase Brass & Copper Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 10 Cal. App.
3d 496, 95 Cal. Rptr. 305, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 961 (1970); Honolulu Oil Corp. v. Franchise
Tax Bd., 60 Cal. 2d 417, 386 P.2d 40, 34 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1963).
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tegrated oil company, as it did not engage in refining and process-
ing. It engaged only in producing and selling petroleum and petro-
leum products in California and seven other states. Typically,
Superior sold its crude petroleum at the well site to other oil com-
panies. All of its California crude oil mined was sold within the
state and all of its crude oil mined outside the state was sold
outside California. Its executive office was in Los Angeles, which
handled accounting, insurance, and the purchasing of equipment
for the entire enterprise. Superior sought unitary business treat-
ment in order to apply losses incurred in Arkansas and Louisiana
to offset its California income. The state, on the other hand,
wanted to tax Superior as a separate business. The court rejected
the state's position and found that Superior was a unitary business.
The decision was based on the centralized performance of certain
supporting functions by Superior's executive office, and its contri-
bution to out-of-state business. The court declared:
It is only through a multitude of individual operations which precede and
make possible the outflow of petroleum at a producing well that Superior is
able to obtain possession of a product which it can market. While the actual
recovery and sale of the crude oil are, perhaps, local activities, nevertheless
very extensive interstate transactions are theretofore involved in the other
individual operations which make such production possible. The evidence
here reveals that such essential factors as land acquisition, exploration,
technology, testing, availability of equipment and personnel, financing and
many others are definitely interstate in character. It must also be considered
that each producing well in a particular state is the end product of inter-
state activities which may involve many other unproductive wells in many
other states. Superior's products are thus acquired for the local market only
as the result of interstate transactions .... 6
The court concluded that Superior's operations were substan-
tially dependent upon the following out-of-state operations: trans-
fers of funds from out-of-state assets to finance California opera-
tions, legal counselling provided by company counsel outside the
state, the transfer of equipment and materials from out-of-state
branches, fiscal control, technical and laboratory assistance, and
the transfer of employees from other branches."7
That Superior was dependent on the out-of-state supportive
functions enumerated above proves that it is the out-of-state func-
96. 60 Cal.2d at 415-16, 386 P.2d at 39, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 550-51.
97. Id. at 414, 386 P.2d at 39, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 550-51.
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tions which contributed to the savings inside the state. Also,
whatever savings weve obtained by centralized management in Los
Angeles were not sufficiently material to allow the California opera-
tions to make any significant contribution to overall earnings." A
separate business existed in California because the contribution by
management services in California to earnings was immaterial and
there was a lack of interdependence at the basic operations level.
The critical factor for finding a unitary business was absent be-
cause there was no contribution to earnings derived from the other
state's operations. To subject the operations in the other states to
apportionment as a unitary business would cause income earned in
other states to be taxed in this taxing jurisdiction. In sum, Superior
Oil pushes the unitary business concept to an extreme that is in-
consistent with the objective of formula apportionment and vio-
lates the due process clause by exceeding the jurisdictional power
of a state to tax income."
e. The "Interdependent and of Mutual Benefit" Test
Some states define a unitary business as one in which the opera-
tions in the taxing state and the operations outside the state are
interdependent and of mutual benefit to each other. An illustration
of the application of this test is provided by Western Auto Supply
Co. v. Commissioner of Taxation. 100 In this case, the taxpayer was a
Missouri corporation engaged in the retail and wholesale merchan-
dising of automotive parts on a nationwide basis. The corporation
sought to divorce its wholesaling activity from its retail operations
by separately accounting for the retail operations in Minnesota. 0
The Minnesota Supreme Court found a unitary business on the ba-
sis of the reciprocal relationship of the centralized activity with re-
tail operations. The court stressed the contribution which the retail
operations made to the total profit.' The court stated: "[t]he test
...is whether its various parts are interdependent and of mutual
benefit so as to form one unit rather than separate business enti-
ties, and not whether the operating experience of the parts is the
98. Id. at 412-13, 386 P.2d at 38, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 549-50.
99. See pt. II supra.
100. 245 Minn. 346, 71 N.W.2d 797 (1955).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 353, 71 N.W.2d at 805; see also Fleming v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 157 F.2d
888 (10th Cir. 1946).
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same in all places."'' 3
This language of mutual benefit in the above definition signifies
that the operations in the taxing jurisdiction and the operations
outside that jurisdiction must contribute to each other. In contrast,
the "dependent upon or contribute to" definition discussed ear-
lier ' has no such mutuality requirement. The "mutual benefit"
definition is therefore more restrictive. Those businesses that con-
tribute to outside operations, but do not receive any benefit from
such outside operations, may not be classified as a unitary business
under this definition. For example, if in the taxing state a business
is engaged in engineering services and consulting, and in a neigh-
boring state the same taxpayer engages in mining operations, the
mining operations receive substantial assistance from the engineers
employed in the neighboring state. However, in furnishing such
technicial advice, the engineering consulting business does not re-
ceive a fee. Under the "mutual benefit" definition, the mining op-
erations would not be classified as a unitary business with the engi-
neering consultancy because the former did not benefit the latter.
However, the mutual benefit test ignores the fact that the engineer-
ing business substantially contributed to the earnings of the mining
operations. Therefore, the mining operations should be combined
with the engineering consultancy as a single unitary business.
f. "Essential to Operation" Test
An even more restrictive test of a unitary business was adopted
by the Minnesota court in Skelly Oil Co. v. Commissioner of Taxa-
tion. 05 In that case, the taxpayer was an integrated oil company. It
produced, manufactured, and marketed crude oil products and ac-
cessories. It also maintained its own pipelines.' However, Skelly
sold the bulk of the oil it produced to other oil companies; less than
ten percent of the crude oil Skelly produced was manufactured by
it into gasoline, lubrication oil, and other products. In Minnesota,
Skelly marketed products manufactured from its crude oil re-
sources outside the state. Minnesota applied a three-factor formula
to Skelly's entire net income. The court sustained Skelly's conten-
tion that its Minnesota marketing operations were separate and
103. 245 Minn. at 353, 71 N.W.2d at 805.
104. See pt. Ill(B)(1)(b) supra.
105. 269 Minn. 351, 131 N.W.2d 632 (1964).
106. Id. at 352, 131 N.W.2d at 634.
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distinct from the manufacturing operations.
In finding a separate business, the court relied on two critical
facts. The first was that Skelly's refining and marketing operations
did not serve to increase the amount of the company's production
income ouside the state; the second was that "the business of pro-
ducing was not dependent upon the business of marketing. Each
business could be operated entirely independent of each other."' 1
The court noted that some companies are engaged only in the pro-
ducing business, others only in marketing and refining. Because
there was no "connection or interdependence" between the two
businesses of production and marketing, no income could be allo-
cated to Minnesota.108
The Skelly case represents one extreme of defining the contours
of a unitary business.' The production of crude oil out-of-state
and the marketing of these same products in Minnesota were inter-
dependent operations. Concerted activities were carried out to
bring a product from production to sale, resulting in a profit. De-
spite the fact that some market prices are available for crude oil,
the segregation of manufacturing and selling profit still involved a
great degree of estimation. The interdependence at this basic oper-
ations level suggests that the activity in the taxing state is a por-
tion of the "series of transactions" contributing to the profits of the
company. The Skelly case disregards the underlying rationale for
the development of formula apportionment. Separate accounting
is inadequate to compute the profits of a business where interde-
pendent operations are carried on in more than one state."0
Operational interdependence occurs when property or the ser-
vices of individuals contribute directly to the earning of income
which is the inseparable end-product of these elements. In the tex-
tiles example offered above,' operational interdependence is pres-
ent. All of the property and services involved in the manufactur-
ing and selling operations contribute to the earning of consolidated
income. Therefore, the definition used by the court in Skelly is too
restrictive."' By holding that the operations have to be essential to
107. Id. at 367, 131 N.W.2d at 643.
108. Id. at 367-68, 131 N.W.2d at 643.
109. See Hellerstein, supra note 3.
110. See pt. IV infra.
111. See example used in pt. I supra.
112. See Hellerstein, supra note 3, at 490-91.
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one another, it allows some truly unitary businesses to escape taxa-
tion. The fact remains that while there may be operational inde-
pendence among the separate business units, there is interdepen-
dence among these companies in an economic sense; namely, a
single flow of goods and services in a single "series of transaction"
culminating in the earning of income of the entire group. As was
recognized in the Underwood Typewriter and Bass, Ratliff"3 cases,
it is the inseparable nature of this continuous earning process that
renders a business unitary.
2. Economic Effect Tests
Economic unity is shown where two or more series of activities,
although independent from an operational standpoint, create a
positive effect on the earnings of the business."1 ' Operational unity
occurs when property or the services of individuals directly contrib-
ute to the earnings of income by the corporation."5 Under these
tests, a unitary business should be found where the combined posi-
tive effects of the separate operations on the company's earnings
are significant. The merit of the economic and operational unity
test is its emphasis on the economic effect of the operations of the
multistate business within and without the taxing jurisdiction.
Typically, economic advantages accrue at a management or sup-
porting services level. An example of this is Butler Brothers v. Mc-
Colgan." As discussed earlier,"7 the taxpayer in this case operated
seven wholesale stores in seven states. Each store had its separate
operations. However, because of the large volume of wholesale
goods needed to supply seven stores, the company was able to buy
at large quantities and obtain favorable prices. The purchasing
profit was a substantial element of success in the company."' Be-
cause each of the separate stores contributed to the income advan-
113. See notes 46-58 supra and accompanying text.
114. Oregon follows this definition of operational and economic unity. See Hamilton
Management Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 253 Or. 602, 457 P.2d 486 (1969). The unitary
business concept is the subject of considerable litigation in Oregon. See John 1. Hass, Inc.,
277 Or. 170, 361 P.2d 820 (1961); Zale-Salem, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 237 Or. 261, 391
P.2d 601 (1964); Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Department of Revenue, 4 Or. T.R. 284
(1971).
115. See Hamilton Management Corp. v. State Tax Comi'n, 253 Or. 602, 457 P.2d 486
(1969).
116. 17 Cal. 2d 664, 111 P.2d 334 (1941), aff'd, 315 U.S. 501 (1942).
117. See notes 64-68 supra and accompanying text.
118. 17 Cal. 2d at 669, 111 P.2d at 337.
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tage obtained, the separate operations welded into a single
business.
Another example of economic unity is a small loan business.'
Small loan companies have offices in a large number of states. Be-
cause of the volume of loan demand generated by operating a large
number of offices, the company is in a better position to obtain
bank financing at lower rates. This lower interest rate is an impor-
tant element in the company's financial success.
Although savings can be achieved by the central performance of
a wide variety of supporting functions, not all such savings should
be considered significant enough to find a unitary business. Some
standard of materiality should be used.'20 Only when the savings
are substantially related to the income involved should the opera-
tions be classified as a unitary business. For example, performance
of central accounting, purchase of supplies and handling insurance
may produce an insignificant amount of savings to the individual
separate operaticns. Therefore, the operations which share such
supporting services should not be regarded as a unitary business on
the basis of these services alone.
The Oregon Supreme Court applied the economic and opera-
tional unity test in Hamilton Management Corp. v. State Tax
Commission.'' There, the taxpayer was a Delaware corporation
with its principal office in Colorado. In Oregon, it engaged in busi-
ness as an investment advisor and sales agent for a mutual fund
owned by Hamilton. In addition, all investment advisory services
were rendered in Colorado and the personnel and business activi-
ties of the taxpayer's sales division were entirely separate. Both di-
visions, however, made use of the same legal, accounting, and sup-
ply departments.'
The issue presented to the court was whether the income re-
ceived by Hamilton Management from Hamilton Mutual Funds for
advisory services should be considered as part of the unitary busi-
ness. In applying the operational and economic unity test, the
court noted that:
119. See Household Fin. Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 230 Cal. App. 2d 926, 41 Cal. Rptr.
565 (1965).
120. See E. Hendriksen, ACCOUNTING THEORv 106-08, 562-64 (1970).
121. 253 Or. 602, 457 P.2d 486 (1969).
122. Id. at 605, 457 P.2d at 488.
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Income, no matter where received, ordinarily is the product of economic in-
fluences operating from many sources, some far back in the chain of eco-
nomic cause and effect. To establish nexus it is necessary to show that the
taxpayer has, in the conduct of his business, taken advantage of the econ-
omy of the taxing state to produce the income which is subjected to tax.'
In this connection, the Oregon court noted that Hamilton Manage-
ment did not take advantage of the economy of the State of Oregon
or receive any other benefits provided by the state in rendering
investment advice in Colorado.'2 ' The business of selling mutual
funds in Oregon did not depend upon or contribute to the invest-
ment advisory business in Colorado. There was neither operational
nor economic unity because the two activities were unrelated.'1
3. Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue
In Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue,' the tax-
payer is a Delaware corporation with general offices in Texas. For
the tax years of 1965 through 1968, Exxon's corporate organization
consisted of three parts: corporate management, coordination and
services management, and operations management. Corporation
management was the highest level of management in the company.
The operations management was responsible for directing the oper-
ating activities of the individual functional segments of the com-
pany. Each functional segment was organized into a separate de-
partment which operated independently of the other operating
segments. The individual functional segments under operations
management consisted of exploration and production; refining;
marketing; marine; coal and shale oil; minerals and land manage-
ment. The three major departments were exploration and produc-
tion, refining, and marketing. ' "
Exxon's management philosophy was to have each department
independently responsible for its performance. Each functional de-
partment was to compete with other departments for investment
funds and with other members of the industry. There was no re-
quirement that crude oil produced by the production department
flow through the marketing department outlets in the form of
123. Id. at 609-10, 457 P.2d at 489.
124. Id. at 610, 457 P.2d at 490.
125. Id.
126. 90 Wis.2d 700, 281 N.W.2d 94, prob. juris. noted, 100 S.Ct. 446 (1979).
127. Id. at 706, 281 N.W.2d at 98.
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Humble refined products. Transfer of products and raw materials
between departments were based on competitive wholesale
prices. 121
Exxon has a uniform credit card system used nationwide which
serves as a marketing tool. it is administered centrally in Houston,
Texas, Promotion of Exxon products is also performed there. 12
Exxon's activities in Wisconsin consisted of the marketing of gas-
oline and fuel oil, and to a much lesser extent motor oils, greases,
and other automobile accessories. The gasoline and fuel oil sold in
Wisconsin by Exxon did not originate in Exxon's oil wells; rather,
they came into the state as a result of an exchange agreement be-
tween Exxon and an unrelated company. The purpose of the ex-
change agreement was to save transportation costs. Because the
unrelated company's refining facilities in the Midwest were in ex-
cess of marketing demands, Exxon obtained its supply of gasoline
in Wisconsin with reduced transportation costs. The motor oils and
greases sold in Wisconsin were manufactured by Exxon outside of
the state. )Although the opinion of the Wisconsin Supreme Court
did not indicate the amount of such sales, these products appar-
ently made up an insignificant percentage of the total sales in Wis-
consin. The other automobile accessories were purchased by Ex-
xon's Houston purchasing office from outside suppliers. 130
For the tax years in question, Exxon filed its tax returns on a
separate accounting basis. The Wisconsin Department of Revenue
sought to tax Exxon on a unitary business basis, combining Ex-
xon's entire three functional departments, exploration and produc-
tion, marketing, and refining, as one unitary business. The Wiscon-
sin Tax Appeals Commission modified the Revenue Department's
action by finding that Exxon's three functional departments, explo-
ration and production, marketing, and refining, were each a uni-
tary business. The Commission also found that, although Exxon's
Wisconsin marketing operations were an integral part of its entire
marketing business, they were not an integral part of Exxon's ex-
ploration and production function or refining function. The basis of
this finding was that there was "no economic dependence between
Exxon's Wisconsin marketing operations and the exploration and
128. Id. at 715-16, 281 N.W.2d at 102.
129. Id. at 716-17, 281 N.W.2d at 103.
130. Id. at 717-18, 281 N.W.2d at 103-04.
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production and refining functions."'' On review; the Circuit Court
for Dane County reversed the Commission on this issue. It found
that Exxon's total business, including the three functional depart-
ments, within and without Wisconsin constituted a unitary busi-
ness. "2 Exxon appealed to the Wisconsin Supreme Court. The Wis-
consin Supreme Court rejected the use of the "economic
dependence" test employed by the Commission. The court an-
nounced that the "full test" for a unitary business requires "a de-
termination of whether the operation of the portion of the business
is 'dependent upon or contributory to the operation of the business
outside the state.' "I" However, the court did not distinguish the
difference in application of the two tests. In applying the test, the
court gave significant weight to the testimony offered by a com-
pany official, who stated that:
The profitability of the petroleum industry is very sensitive and directly re-
lated to the full utilization of the capacity of the facilities. . . Where you
have high capital investments in refineries, the existence of an assured sup-
ply of raw materials and crude is important and the assured and stable out-
let for products is important, and therefore when there are - when these
segments are under a single corporate entity, it provides for some assurance
that the risk of disruptions in refining operations are minimized due to sup-
ply and demand imbalances that may occur from time to time."s
Based on such testimony and the organization of Exxon, the court
found that Exxon's production and refining functions depended
upon the marketing operation to provide an outlet for its products.
The court therefore, concluded that Exxon's production and explo-
ration, refining, and marketing constituted a unitary business.'"
This result was reached despite a lack of operational interdepen-
dence; that is, a lack of the flow of goods and services at the oper-
ating unit level. Exxon appealed to the United States Supreme
Court on this issue, contending that Wisconsin's classification of it
as a unitary business violated the due process and commerce
clauses.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that Exxon's entire produc-
tion, exploration, and marketing functions were a unitary business,
131. Id. at 706-07, 281 N.W.2d at 98.
132. Id. at 707, 281 N.W.2d at 98.
133. Id. at 715-16, 281 N.W.2d at 102.
134. Id. at 716, 281 N.W.2d at 103.
135. Id. at 721-22, 281 N.W.2d at 105-06.
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despite the fact that there was no interdependence at the operating
level. '3 Wisconsin's contribution to the out-of-state production, ex-
ploration, and refining operations was premised upon the market-
ing function's effect on the supply and demand forces of the mar-
ket. To the extent that Wisconsin activity increased the nationwide
demand of petroleum, Exxon's production and refining facilities lo-
cated out-of-state does increase production. The increase of pro-
duction would increase the earnings of the production, exploration,
and refining department. Based on this reasoning, the earnings ef-
fect test'37 would seem to be satisfied.
A question arises as to whether the nexus relied on by the Wis-
consin Supreme Court is too tenuous; that is, whether the link be-
tween cause and effect in the market place can be relied on as sat-
isfying the test suggested above. Under the economic effects test, a
business is unitary if its in-state operations contribute to the out-
of-state and overall company earnings.'u This contribution to earn-
ings is found in the way the operations are related to each other. In
the case of Exxon, although the marketing department extensively
sells the products of outside suppliers, sales of Exxon-produced oil
are deemed to be enhanced because of the exchange contracts
made possible by the marketing facilities located throughout the
United States. The size of Exxon is significant; it is the largest pro-
ducer and marketer of gasoline. The effect of the marketing opera-
tions on the production operations is not determinable. The supply
and demand of petroleum and oil in the market is the result of
many different forces. Without the extensive marketing network of
Exxon, its production and refinery sales would not be as efficient
and even somewhat impaired. However, any effect felt by its pro-
duction and refinery department is that produced by the market
forces, a resultant of various factors. Similarly, based on the Wis-
consin court's opinion, any contribution by the marketing function
to the production department is effected through an autonomous
marketplace. This is not the type of earnings that can, or should,
satisfy the economic effects test. Therefore, only that portion of the
taxpayer's business which received a more direct benefit from the
Wisconsin operation should be combined with such Wisconsin op-
erations and thereby be classified as a unitary business. In this
136. Id. at 721-22, 281 N.W.2d at 105-06.
137. See also Humble Oil Refining Co. v. Dep't of Rev., 4 Or. T.R. 284, 292-93 (1971).
138. See pt. m supra.
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case, Exxon's marketing department should be classified as a uni-
tary business by itself.
IV. Division of Income Methods
Application of the test of whether a taxpayer's operations within
the taxing state are a unitary business is the preliminary step in
determining the tax base. Once the operations within the state are
classified as unitary or separate, three methods are available to al-
locate that portion of the taxpayer's income to sources within the
state.
A. Specific Allocation
Specific allocation 3 ' singles out certain items of income which by
their nature are assignable to precise geographic locations. Exam-
ples of such types of income are rents from real property and divi-
dends.'"0 Under this method, the income of a unitary business will
not include such items of income as are attributed entirely to a
single jurisdiction."' However, in those states where the unitary
concept is strictly adhered to the receipt of income closely related
to the regular business activity conducted in the taxing state will
be taxed by that state regardless of its allocability to a specific ju-
risdiction.' There has been disagreement with this practice based
on the theory that gains or losses from the sale or other dispositions
of such property is attributable to fluctuations in market values.'"
The specific allocation of income to a particular state must be
examined in the context of the state's taxing power. Under the due
139. For comprehensive treatment of this subject, see ALTMAN & KEESLING, supra note 3,
at 67-87; 1964 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 197-217; Boren Specific Allocation of Corpo-
rate Income in California: Some Problems in the Uniform Division Of Income For Tax Pur-
poses, 30 TAX L. REv. 607 (1975).
140. For example, Iowa requires specific allocation of interest dividends, rents, and royal-
ties. Iowa Code tit. XVI, ch. 422, § 422.33-1a, Reg. 22.33(1)4 to -7 (1971 & Cum. Supp.
1979). In California, the pertinent statute is CAL. REVENUE & TAX. CODE §§ 25123-27 (West
1970). Specific allocation is utilized in the UDITPA. See MTC, supra note 9, at 6318-22.
141. ALTMAN & KEESLING, supra note 3, at 67; Hartman, State Taxation of Corporate
Income from A Multistate Business, 13 VAND. L. REv. 21, 57 (1959)[hereinafter cited as
Hartman].
142. 1964 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 198-200. This section describes the various
standards for determining relationships with other income used at the time to decide
whether receipts were specifically allocated. Some jurisdictions have adopted the UDITPA, see
note 9 supra, and may therefore be applying different tests.
143. See Keesling & Warren, Unitary Concept in the Allocation of Income, 12 HASTINGS
L.J. 42 (1960).
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process and commerce clauses, a state has power to tax residents
upon their entire net income, wherever earned."' Similarly, a state
is the creator of a domestic corporation and for that privilege is
able to tax its net income wherever earned."5 Obviously, this opens
the business to the risk of double taxation if the income from prop-
erty is also taxed by the state where such property is located., In
addition, a foreign corporation can acquire a "commercial domi-
cile" other than in the state of its incorporation."7 Multiple taxa-
tion can occur if both the "commercial domicile" state and the in-
corporation state can constitutionally reach the same income.
Moreover, the owner of intangibles may neither be domiciled in nor
be a resident of the taxing state. It is therefore possible that its
income may be treated as having its source in such state."'
This possibility of multiple taxation has caused much concern.
Different concepts of what is a unitary business and what is uni-
tary business income cause severe problems of double taxation
through specific allocation. One state may regard a business as uni-
tary and therefore subject all its income to apportionment. The
"commercial domicile" state may consider the same business as
non-unitary and therefore allocate its dividend income from wholly
owned subsidiary corporations to the domicile state."' Therefore,
the same income from the subsidiary is taxed twice; first, through
formula apportionment as unitary income; second, through specific
allocation as dividend.
144. New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308 (1937)(rent from out-of-state land);
Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n of Mississippi, 286 U.S. 276 (1932)(compensation for per.
sonal services rendered outside taxing state); Maguire v. Trefry, 253 U.S. 12 (1920) (net
income from bonds held in trust and administered in another state).
145. See Matson Navigation Co. v. State Board, 297 U.S. 441 (1936) (tax measured by
net income); cf. Cornell Steamboat Co. v. Sohmer, 235 U.S. 549 (1915) (gross receipts from
business transacted within the state). There has been considerable commerce clause interfer-
ence when the state tries to tax the gross income of a domestic corporation engaged in inter-
state commerce. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938). However, the due process
clause is said not to forbid a tax by the state where the income is earned, because the taxing
state affords the protection and security which enables the taxpayer to earn its profit. Shaf-
fer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920).
146. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Virginia, 305 U.S. 19 (1938).
147. Wheeling Steel Co. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193 (1936) (property tax on intangibles).
148. See, e.g., New York ex rel. Whitney v. Graves, 299 U.S. 366 (1937) (income from
sale of right to seat on stock exchange located in taxing state).
149. ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 99 Idaho 924, 592 P.2d 39, appeal dock-
eted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3031 (U.S. June 8, 1979) (No. 78-1839); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Vermont, 136
Vt. 545, 394 A.2d 1147, prob. juris. noted, 99 S.Ct. 2157 (1979).
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B. Separate Accounting
Under separate accounting, a multistate corporation will keep
separate books of the income and expenses for its operations within
each state. 1° Under this method, a business within the state is
treated as separate and distinct from a business conducted outside
the state.'51 The basic assumption of separate accounting is that
net income derived from each state can be accurately measured.
The taxable income in each state is computed as if the taxpayer's
activities were confined solely to the taxing state. The gross income
from all business operations is first determined; the allowable de-
ductions are then subtracted. The resulting net income is attrib-
uted to the taxing state.
If a business is truly separate from the business conducted
outside the state,' division of income by separate accounting can
be accurately and easily accomplished. However, where in-state
business activity comprises only a portion of a single unitary busi-
ness, separate accounting is imbued With difficulties. The use of a
separate accounting method for a unitary business would involve
arbitrary determinations based on conjecture. Piecemeal determi-
nations must be made to attribute total gross income to each of the
various functions or activities in the different states. This requires
the use of a hypothetical basis upon which values are assigned to
the product as it passes each business stage.' Similar difficulties
150. Discussion of separate accounting is treated more fully in ALTMAN & KEESLINO,
supra note 3, at 89-102; 1964 HOUSE REP., supra note 1, at 160-67.
151. Some writers suggested a refinement in labelling separate accounting: (1) transac-
tional separate accounting, where the business activities in the several states are in fact
related, but by constructing hypothetical analogies, they are separated in the accounting
measurement process; and (2) entity separate accounting, where the business activities in
the state and out of the state are truly separate. Boren, Separate Accounting in California
and Uniformity in Apportioning Corporate Income, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 478, 486-90 (1971).
152. A clear example is a conglomerate with devisions in the aerospace, tobacco, and
motion picture industry; each division conducts business entirely within one state. See
MTC, supra note 9, 6125.
153. To allocate profits to the various stages from production to sale has been the subject
of extensive study. Transfer pricing (the assigning of a price to the product in its movement
from one division to another) and intra-company transactions pricing can be made on some
consistent and rational basis. See generally C. HORNOREN, COST AcCOUNTNG (1972). How-
ever, while a transfer price may serve a useful purpose for internal management reports, it
may not work well for state tax purposes. In the latter, there is present the motive to manip-
ulate prices to the taxpayer's advantage. The lack of state resources to audit such pricing
techniques render it nonpreferable. The situation is analogous to the federal income taxation
of companies under common control. I.R.C. § 482. There, the Internal Revenue Service en-
countered enormous difficulties. See H.R. REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1962).
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are met in the determination of expenses.' 5' The fact that certain
expenses are incurred in a state may not justify assigning them to
that state. For a unitary business, the expenses are incurred to
benefit the entire enterprise, not simply that portion within the
state. '5 For example, it is generally recognized that the overhead
expenses should be allocated by a formula,' even if separate ac-
counting is used for all the other transactions. These defects are
present due to the lack of any rational basis by which to make an
apportionment and the fact that the divisions of a business do not
deal at arms-length.
These difficulties and the lack of effective audit procedures has
led to the rejection of separate accounting for a unitary business and
to the adoption of formula apportionment.'57 The general approach
of the majority of states is that separate accounting should be re-
stricted to truly separate businesses, while apportionment should
be used for a unitary business.'
C. Formula Apportionment
Formula apportionment' is considered a preferable alternative
154. ALTMAN & KEESLING, supra note 3, at 93.
155. "With regard to a unitary business, the place where expenses affecting the entire
business are incurred has little or no bearing on the question of how such expenses should be
allocated . . . . Slelling expenses in one state may logically affect the amount of income
realized from sales in other states . . . ." John Deere Plow Co. v. Franchise Tax Board, 38
Cal. 2d 214, 226, 238 P.2d 569, 576 (1951), appeal dismissed, 343 U.S. 939 (1952).
156. Assume in our textiles business example, see pt. I supra, that the business has a
gross income of $2,000,000. Total operating expenses amount to $1,500,000. It thus has a
total operating income of $500,000. Under separate accounting, this $500,000 would have to
be divided among (1) the cotton processing function in South Carolina, (2) garment manu-
facturing in New York, and (3) sales functions in Chicago. One way would be to decide on a
(A) "reasonable manufacturing profit" basis: e.g., 10% of gross income, or $200,000, or (B)
use market prices, if available: i.e., the prices at which the garment division would need to
pay to outside suppliers for the cloth it gets from the cotton processing division. See ALTMAN
& KEESLING, supra note 3, at 90-91.
157. See pt. 4(c) infra.
158. A few states show preference for separate accounting in their statutes: Alabama,
Alaska, Mississippi, New Mexico and South Carolina. In other states there are generalized
provisions authorizing separate accounting where the prescribed method of apportionment or
allocation produces an inequitable result. For representative cases where the use of separate
accounting was upheld, see Standard Oil Co. v. Thoresen, 29 F.2d 708 (8th Cir. 1928); Fisher
v. Standard Oil Co., 12 F.2d 744 (8th Cir. 1926); Skelly Oil Co. v. Comm'r of Tax., 269
Minn. 351, 131 N.W. 2d 632 (1964); Magnolia Petrol. Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 190
Okla. 172, 121 P.2d 1008 (1941); Standard Oil Co. of Ind. v. Wisconsin Tax Comm'n, 197
Wis. 630, 223 N.W. 85 (1929).
159. For a comprehensive discussion, see ALTMAN & KEESLING, supra note 3, at 107-68;
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to the ineffective treatment of unitary businesses by the separate
accounting method. This method recognizes that income and de-
ductions are so closely related in a unitary business that they can-
not be precisely sited in individual geographical locations.16N In-
come producing activities are said to be a unit. The theory of
formula apportionment is that the net income of a business is more
dependent on some factors than others.'1' At present, the factors
generally accepted are sales, property, and payroll."' Each factor
can be seen as either a source of the taxpayer's income or a source
of costs to the taxing jurisdiction.' 3 The formula measures the
weight of each factor' 4 present in a particular state and compares
it with all factors present in the entire business." 5 The resulting
ratio is used to allocate the net profits of the business to the
state.' Though apportionment by formula may be considered ap-
BEAMAN, supra note 3, at 3.6 to -16, 7.10 to -19; 1964 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 168-94;
Hartman, supra note 141, at 64-74.
160. Hartman, supra note 141, at 64-65.
161. For an economic analysis of this theory, see Wilkie, A Theoretical Basis For the Allo-
cation of Multistate Income by Unitary Business Under State Corporate Net Income Taxes,
13 THE TAX EXECUTIVE 157-74 (1961).
162. This is the formula under UDITPA, supra note 9, 6168-6286. A list of states with
apportionment formulae and a description of the factors used can be found in [1967] STATE
& LOCAL TAXES, ALL STATES UNrr (P-H) 1046. The three factor formula was introduced by
Massachusetts in 1919. For a history of the development of factor formulae, see BEAMAN,
supra, note 3, chs. 7, 10, 19. Persuasive arguments have been made concerning elimination
of the sales factor. See, e.g., Hariss, Interstate Apportionment of Business Income, 49 ECON.
REv. 398, 400 (1959).
163. See also Studenski, Toward a Theory of Business Taxation, 48 J. POL. ECON. 621
(1940). For the proposition that income is from a source within the state, see Cohen, State
Tax Allocations and Formulae which Affect Management Operating Decisions, 1 J. TAX. 2, 3
(1954).
164. Each factor is expressed as a fraction. The numerator is the dollar amount of the
item found or occurring in the tax jurisdiction. The denominator is the dollar amount of the
item found or occurring in all relevant jurisdictions.
165. Whether to include foreign income and, consequently foreign items, in the denomi-
nators of each factor is a major question debated by proponents of uniform legislation. New
York State Bar Ass'n Tax Section Comm. on Interstate Taxation, Proposals for Improve-
ment of Interstate Taxation Bills, (H.R. 1538 and S. 317), 25 TAX LAW. 433, 463 (1972).
166. The procedure is to multiply the tax base subject to apportionment (generally the
net income of the taxpayer determined by state procedures, with adjustment for any income
subject to specific allocation or separate accounting) by this resulting fraction (ratio); the
result is income taxed in that jurisdiction. The ultimate fraction combines the factors in
note 164 supra, and divides these by the total number of factors:
Property in Payroll in Taxing Sales inTaxing
Tax Base x Taxing Jurisdiction + Jurisdiction + Jurisdiction
Property everywhere Payroll everywhere Sales everywhere
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propriate to a particular business, some writers believe that not all
of a unitary business' income may be connected to the business in
the taxing state.6 7 These writers maintain that income items with
a specific situs in a foreign state be excluded from total income in
the taxing state. Others would require that all income of a unitary
business be subject to apportionment in all states.'
In some jurisdictions, formula apportionment can be applied in-
dependently of the unitary theory, as an option for taxpayers who
do not wish to use separate accounting.' In most jurisdictions,
however, apportionment may only be applied to unitary businesses.
Obviously, the result of formula apportionment is an estimation.
The profits of a business can hardly be limited to the three enu-
merated factors. 170 The virtue of this formula, however, is its ease of
application' and the simplicity of audit procedures.' To the ex-
tent that the formulae are uniform from state to state, the appor-
tionment method is an attractive alternative. While most states
adopt the three-factor formula, differences exist in their definition
of each factor.' This exposes businesses to the risk of overtaxation
and the states to the risk of undertaxation.17 4
Specific allocation and separate accounting are closely related in
theory. 7  Both presume certain income items can be completely
The factors need not be weighted equally, however. E.g., Florida weighs its sales factor 50%
and its property and payroll factors 25% each. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 220.15(4) (West Supp.
1979).
167. This is mandated by the UDITPA, supra note 10, 91,409-A. See also Silverstein,
Problems of Apportionment in Taxation of Multistate Business, 4 TAx. L. REv. 207, 210-11
(1949). See discussion on specific allocation in pt. IV(A) supra.
168. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 48 U.S.L.W. 4306 (Mar. 19, 1980);
Dexter, Taxation of Income from Intangibles of Multistate-Multinational Corporations, 29
VAND. L. Rzv. 401 (1976); 1964 HousE RFPORT, supra note 1, at 161-63.
169. See, e.g., Boren, Separate Accounting in California and Uniformity in Apportioning
Corporate Income, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 478, 487-89 (1971).
170. See notes 162 & 166 supra.
171. The data upon which the formula apportionment is made can easily be derived from
a company's internal financial statements, which in most cases are routinely prepared. See
Hartman, supra note 141, at 66.
172. Audit procedures would be limited to accuracy of the totals derived from internal
accounting information. This eliminates the need to verify estimation techniques used in
separate accounting.
173. [19671 STATE & LocAL TAXES, ALL STATES UNrr (P-H), 1046; 1964 HousE REPORT,
supra note 1, at 170.
174. Studenski, The Need for Federal Curbs on State Taxes on Interstate Commerce: An
Economist's Viewpoint, 46 VA. L. REv. 1121, 1123-24 (1960).
175. Beaman considers specific allocation to be a form of separate accounting. BEAMAN,
supra note 3, at 6 n.18.
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isolated from the remaining portions of a business. The two con-
cepts, however, are different in practical effect. Specific allocation
emphasizes both the nature of the income items and their connec-
tion with a geographical situs. Separate accounting is premised on
the severance of a business along state boundaries. The justifica-
tion for the severance is that the operations inside and outside the
state are indeed separate and not unitary. Formula apportionment
focuses on the unitary nature of the business. The income produced
within the unitary parameters of the business is apportioned by
formula. It is the distinction between a "unitary" business and a
"separate" business which determines when each of the income di-
vision methods should be used.
For an individual taxpayer, it is quite possible that only one
method or a combination of the three is used. The same taxpayer
may engage in several lines of business, some partially unitary,
some wholly separate from the taxing state. Therefore, formula ap-
portionment will be applied to the unitary portion and separate ac-
counting to the rest. Also, some income may be classified as inher-
ently derived from the situs, and is not unitary.' This income is
barved out of the entire profits before any part of it is divided by
formula apportionment.
V. Conclusion
The objective of income apportionment rules is to devise a
method by which to calculate fairly the amount of income attribu-
table to sources within the taxing state. The unitary business con-
cept advances this objective by indentifying those businesses where
the operations in the taxing state are inseparable from those
outside the state. Because of the significant contribution of in-state
operations to overall company earnings, and the inadequacy of sep-
arate accounting to compute the contribution by the in-state oper-
ations, formula apportionment is an appropriate alternative in cal-
culating income within the taxing state.
176. There are three possible avenues a state may take:
(i) provide for specific allocation of some items absolutely, with no inquiry as to
whether such income is derived from unitary business or from "business income;"
(ii) allow for specific allocation only for "non-business" income. See, e.g., CAL. REv.
& TAx CODE § 25120(a)(d) (West 1970);
(iii) specifically allocate only income not derived from a "unitary business." This
practice is followed by at least four states: Arizona, California, Hawaii and Oregon.
See 1964 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 199.
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The ultimate criterion should be whether the in-state operations
materially contribute to the company's entire earnings which are
derived partly outside the taxing jurisdiction. Whether this crite-
rion is met can be inferred from the mode of operations. Where
there is great interdependence in a company's basic operations,
such as selling the products which the company itself manufac-
tured, there is usually strong evidence of material contribution to
earnings by in-state operations. By contrast, if there is only inter-
dependence at a management or support services level, such as ac-
counting, legal advice, and central insurance coverage in a manu-
facturing concern, the impact on earnings generated by such
interdependence may be of a limited nature and should not auto-
matically render the business unitary in nature. In such cases, the
effect on earnings due to such interdependence at the management
and support services level must be closely examined.
Use of the above criterion will allow a state to tax a proportion-
ate share of the amount which in-state operations contribute to
out-of-state earnings. This result is economically sound and is con-
sistent with the objective of income apportionment. In fact, such
an approach is mandated by the Constitution.
Peter G. Chen
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